

INCIDENT INVOLVING NW FLIGHT **AMS-DET / 25 DEC 2009**

ACI EUROPE POSITION ***(Brussels, 7 Jan 2010)***

1. Impact of emergency measures mandated by US TSA

The emergency measures mandated by US TSA until 4 January 2010 apply directly upon airlines for their US bound flights. European airports have been assisting all airlines faced with these new measures. Their impact has been as followed:

1.1 Additional staff deployed

Additional staff has systematically been deployed at gates and/or dedicated screening areas for US bound flights to check passengers and their cabin bags. Depending on the cases, they have been deployed:

- **by airlines:** London-Heathrow, Paris-Charles de Gaulle, Dublin, Milan-Malpensa, Nice, Geneva and Oslo.
- **by airports:** Amsterdam-Schiphol (+50 staff), Brussels (+30 staff), Copenhagen (+38 staff), Reykjavik (+15/20 staff), Barcelona (+11 staff), Athens (+10 staff), Helsinki (+10 staff) and Prague (+8 staff).
- **by police & other governmental agencies:** Frankfurt-Main, Hamburg, Zurich (only access control to restricted boarding area for US-bound flights).

In Madrid-Barajas and Stockholm-Arlanda, additional staff has been deployed both by the airport and the airlines concerned (+35 airport staff at Madrid Barajas, +8 airport staff at Stockholm-Arlanda - only for SAS flights). Paris-Charles de Gaulle has also made additional screeners available to assist airlines in the additional checks.

At Milan-Malpensa, additional staff (+ 11 staff) has also been deployed by the airport at the centralised security control point, following a request from local police authorities.

1.2 Direct costs involved

Cost involved by airports for deploying additional staff range from approximately €10.000 to +€50.000 per week. Depending on the cases, these cost are either billed to the airlines concerned (ex: Brussels) or absorbed by the airport in its regular cost base (ex: Amsterdam-Schiphol). Apart from staff costs, additional equipment/signage/communication costs have also been incurred.

1.3 Direct operational impact

Direct operational impact include:

- Decreasing passenger throughput at gates: typically -40% to -60% with long queuing times for passengers (minimum 20 minutes, up to +90 minutes).
- Decreasing throughput at central screening centres - only for Milan-Malpensa): + 13 minutes waiting time. However, other airports have also experienced decreasing throughput at their central screening centre, as they were obliged to dispatch staff from these points to the gates. The lengthy procedures involved to get clearance for security staff and perform required training often made it impossible to hire new staff at such a short notice.
- Flight delays: initially systematic (up to +2 hours), now more contained (depending on the airports, from 10 to 60 minutes); The reduction in delays has usually been achieved by requiring passengers to rush to the gate immediately after check-in and starting boarding procedures earlier (up to 2 hours before departure time).

1.4 Other impact

The following other impacts have been observed:

- Flight delays upon departure involved missing connections at the airport of destination for many passengers, which resulted in significant additional cost for airlines (rerouting, meals, accommodation).
- As passengers were instructed to rush to the gate after check-in, the measures are expected to have a significant impact on airport commercial activities due to the reduction/absence of dwelling times. Both retail and food & beverage activities have been affected. Moreover, one airline (United Airlines) is for the time being applying a strict one-cabin baggage policy preventing passengers from carrying on board goods purchased air-side at the airport separately from their cabin bag.
- Responding to the emergency also involved longer working shifts for staff, which has in turn resulted in higher absenteeism. This could become an issue should the measures become indefinite (need to hire new/additional staff).
- The segregation of gates for US-bound flights has often resulted in an inefficient use of terminal facilities / gates due to infrastructure layout (gates becoming unavailable for other flights).

1.5 Conclusion

Based on the above, **emergency measures of the kind mandated by US TSA are not sustainable in the medium-term**. Had those emergency measures applied during the peak season (summer), their impact would have been even worse (for example, while 231 US-bound flights were operated from Paris-Charles de Gaulle airport during the week 21/27 December 2009, 321 US-bound flights were operated from the same airport during the week 27 July/2 August 2009, usually with larger aircraft than in the winter).

ACI EUROPE will in the coming days carry out a new member survey to assess the impact of the new measures announced by US TSA on 3 January.

2. Short-term follow-up at EU level

Some Member States have indicated that they are about to acquire (Germany) or to require airports to acquire (UK, Netherlands) body scanners for deployment for those flights that are considered to be subject to the specific threat resulting from the event of 25 December.

As body scanners potentially improve detection capabilities in relation to such threat, **ACI EUROPE would welcome their inclusion to the list of acceptable means of detection under the PRAC Regulation.**

However, **ACI EUROPE would firmly object to any EU mandatory use of body scanners** for the following reasons:

- Body scanners are not the all-encompassing solution. Although, as already indicated, body scanners potentially improve detection capabilities, they do not per se guarantee systematic detection of the above mentioned threat.
- Body scanners also raise significant issues, which would need to be fully assessed and taken into account prior to any decision at national and/or EU level, not least in relation to the scope of their possible deployment:
 - **Infrastructural compatibility** – body scanners have a bigger footprint than WTMDs and are heavier than those. Thus, WTMDs cannot just be replaced by body scanners in all cases.
 - **Operational compatibility** – Preliminary results of trials of body scanners conducted at a number of European airports indicate that passenger throughput typically achieved by conventional screening means can hardly be maintained. (during the Schiphol trial, a maximum throughput of three passengers per minute could be achieved).
 - **Financial issues:** each body scanner typically cost around €100.000/€170.000, to which training and other deployment costs need to be added. **Any mandatory requirement for deployment at national or EU level should include related national or EU financing.** In the post 911 context, the financing of aviation security measures should be considered as a State/public responsibility (this is the case in all other regions of the world except Europe).
 - **Privacy issues:** clear and uniform guidelines should be set as to the conditions under which the use of body scanners is fully compatible with privacy requirements.

3. Medium/Long-term follow up at EU level

Since 2001, aviation is faced with a constantly evolving terrorist threat, as evidenced by the events of September 2001, December 2001 (shoes bomb), August 2006 (liquid explosives) and December 2009 (underpants bomb).

Yet, policy and regulatory responses have so far mainly been:

- Reactive, adding new security measures after each occurrence.
- Focused on systematic detection (“what is possible”) through enhanced technology.

They have resulted in:

- Increasing “hassle factor” for passengers (cumbersome and intrusive).
- Increasing operational difficulties for airports and airlines.
- Increasing costs for the aviation system (35% of airports’ operating costs and 41% of airport staff are now security related).

Such an approach is no longer sustainable. While improved detection through enhanced technology needs to be further pursued, it needs to be complemented by increased focus on:

- **Better intelligence** in terms of information analysis and information sharing between all organisations involved and industry partners.
- **Passenger profiling.**

This requires a **new approach to aviation security**, which recognises that:

- The airport is only the very last opportunity to prevent a terrorist act.
- Effective prevention requires more ex-ante intelligence and passenger profiling.
- Efficient security requires risk-based measures with a focus on “what is probable”.

In order to promote this new aviation security system and related processes, **ACI EUROPE proposes that an ad hoc Task Force mandated to provide within 6 months recommendations on essential requirements and issues to be addressed be set up at EU level, with the participation of the EC, Member States (Transport, Internal Affairs and Intelligence experts), ECAC and industry experts.**